The Unfair Practices Act of Colorado and Its Recent Amendment by Creamer, George L.
Denver Law Review 
Volume 26 Issue 7 Article 6 
June 2021 
The Unfair Practices Act of Colorado and Its Recent Amendment 
George L. Creamer 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
George L. Creamer, The Unfair Practices Act of Colorado and Its Recent Amendment, 26 Dicta 162 (1949). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more 
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
DICTA
The Unfair Practices Act of Colorado and Its
Recent Amendment
By GEORGE L. CREAMER
of the Denver Bar
Recency of amendment of and widespread prevalence of discussion con-
cerning the Colorado Unfair Practice Act makes desirable at this time some
discussion relative to the origin and purposes of the act, its effect upon trade,
and the specific nature of recent changes.
Suggested by, or originating concurrently with, their Federal prototype,
the Robinson-Patman Act,' the Unfair Practices acts-of which the Colorado
statute is typical-now exist in twenty-nine states, and have for their funda-
mental purpose preservation of competition. Their principal features are
prohibitions against area or locality discriminations in price, and prohibition
of sales of goods at prices lower than the cost of those goods, with certain
exceptions detailed hereinafter. Their social significance is broad by reason of
their action as a buffer protecting smaller economic units, and so the general
economic community, against "deep cut pricing," "loss-leader" selling, or "hot.
shotting" of goods, practices whereby the wealthiest competing participant,
able longest to withstand self-inflicted losses, may ultimately drive from the
market monetarily weaker foes, deriving for himself the benefits, and inflict-
ing upon the consuming community the detriments incident to monopolistic
or oligopolistic enterprise.
The Unfair Practices Act is not a price-fixing law,2 and is not to be con-
fused as some publicists have, perhaps unwittingly, confused it with the Fair
Trade Act,3 a statute which does authorize the fixing of resale prices of
trademarked or branded merchandise, as specifically permitted by the Miller-
Tydings Act 4 by price maintenance contracts. With the Fair Trade Act this ar-
ticle is not concerned, the area of its effectiveness being quite different from that
covered by the Unfair Practices acts, its purpose being basically different, and
its current interest less.
Moreover, it is not the purpose of this article to present a discussion of
the economic or sociological reasons for such legislation as the Unfair Prac-
tices Act, reasons which the author believes to be of impelling cogency and
force, sought to be obscured by partisan and distorted comment recently,
but it is rather the intention of the author to attempt to state what the act
does and why.
15 U. S. C., 13a, enacted June 19, 1936, and purposed to prevent discrimina-
tion among competing customers, based on rebates, discounts, advertising service charges,
or other preferential pricing procedures applying to interstate commerce.
'Dikeou et al. v. Food Distributors Association, 107 Colo. 38, 50, 108 P. 2d
529 (1940).
' '35 C.S.A., Chapter 165, Section 20, enacted 1937.
15 U.S.C. 1, enacted August 17, 1937, as an amendment to Section 1 of tht Sher.
man Act (passed July 2, 1890), legalizing contracts prescribing minimum resale prices
for trade marked goods where legal under State law.
DICTA
Legislation to Preserve Competition
Because the concept of "competition" has been considered basic in our
economy since the Industrial Revolution, it is only natural to assume that
the law would attempt to preserve so universally sanctioned a societal prac-
tice. This is indeed the case, the law having early developed a theory of
"unfair competition," consisting in the passing off or attempting to pass off
upon the public the goods or business of one person as and for the goods
of another,5 or conducting a trade or business in such manner that there is
an express or implied representation to that effect. Eventually, however, it
become quite clear that the actual dangers to the highly desiderated "com-
petition" did not lie in the direction covered by common-law protective de-
vices. On the contrary, the system which elevated that concept to so high a
station had implicit within it the germ of total destruction of the practice,
as in monopoly, or complete perversion thereof, as in oligopoly. Since it
was clear that these dangers could only be legislatively m.r, there were en-
acted in the United States four major pieces of legislation tending toward
that end:
1. The Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C 1, July 2, 1890.
2. The Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 12, October 15, 1914.
3. The Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 44, September
26, 1914.
4. The Robinson-Patman Act,.15 U.S.C. 13a, June 19, 1936.
While to some extent effective in the sphere of interstate commerce, or
in areas affecting interstate commerce, effectiveness of the Federal legislation
was primarily limited to the area of manufacturing and processing and to
the field of wholesale selling. Matters of a purely intrastate nature, and the
area of retail sales of goods and services first among them, were hardly regu-
lable or cognoscible under the Federal acts. It is that fact that makes the
Unfair Practices acts primarily necessary, and that fact that makes them in
effect, although not so limited by their terms or by any other substantive
requirement of law, primarily applicable to the field of retail selling.
The Unfair Practices Act of the State of Colorado was first enacted in
1937, 6 originating as House Bill No. 642. It was subsequently amended in
1941, 7 and as amended, appears in I C.S.A., Chapter 48, Section 302. It
has been again amended by the 37th General Assembly, in 1949, by Senate
Bill 108, approved by the Governor May 20, 1949.
Whom The Act Covers
The present act, as did its predecessors, applies to "any person, firm, or
corporation doing business in the State of Colorado and engaged in the pro-
duction, manufacture, distributioh or sale of any commodity, or products,
38 Cyc. 756.
* Session Laws of Colorado, 1937, Chapter 261.
'Session Laws of Colorado, 1941, Chapter 227.
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or service or output of a service trade, of general use or consumption, or the
sale of any merchandise or product by any public utility." s However, mo-
tion picture films, delivered under lease to motion picture houses, are not
deemed a "commodity or production of general use or consumption," and
there are expressly exempted from coverage services or products sold, ren-
dered, or furnished by a public utility, subject to regulation by the Colorado
Public Utilities Commission, or by any municipal body.
What The Act Prohibits
1. Area Discriminations. Persons covered are prohibited from discrimi-
nating between different sections, communities or cities or portions thereof,
or different locations therein, by selling or furnishing commodities, products,
or services at a lower rate in one such section, community or city or portion
thereof, or in one location therein, than in another. Under such acts, mean-
ing of the geographical divisions is quite clear, and the word "location" is
used as synonymous with "outlet" in business parlance, the intention being
to prevent baseless price differentials in different outlets, in the same area,
belonging to the same purveyor of commodities, products, or services.
This prohibition, however, is not absolute, but is subject to certain very
definite limitations:
a. Intent: In order to come within the prohibited area, the person cov-
ered must so discriminate "with intent to destroy the competition of" (i) any
regularly established dealer in such commodity, product, or service, or (ii)
any person, firm, or private, municipal, or public corpoation -which "in good
faith intends and attempts to become such dealer."
b. Meeting Competition: It is specifically provided that "This Act shall
not be construed to prohibit the meeting in good faith of a competitive rate. " 9
c. Grade, Quality, Quantity, and Transportation: The act specifically
permits differentials, area-wise, predicated upon allowance for differences in
grade, or quality, or quantity, or based upon differential cost of transporta-
tion of a raw material or commodity from the point of production; or of a
manufactured product or commodity, from the point of manufacture.
Cases at nisi prius under this section of the act have been rare, and there
are, to the author's knowledge, none reported by appellate tribunals, primarily
because the interdicted practices, being most likely to involve persons engaged
in or whose activities affect interstate commerce, come generally within the
purview of Federal legislation. However, should the points arise under state
law, it is logical to assume that the courts would give to the concepts of
"intent" and of "competition" the same basic treatment accorded them with
reference to other sections of the act, particularly those concerning sales
below cost.
37th General Assembly, Senate Bill 108, Sec. 1.
Ibid..
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2. Sales Below Cost: Persons covered, including any person, partnership,
firm, corporation, joint stock company, or other association engaged in busi-
ness in the State of Colorado, are forbidden to (i) sell, (ii) offer for sale, or
(iii) advertise for sale "any article or product, or service or output of a
service trade" for less than the cost thereof to such vendor.
Not only are sales below cost so prohibited, but one is not allowed to
(i) give, (ii) offer to give, or (iii) advertise the intent to give away "any
such article, product, service, or output of a service trade."
The prohibition, however, as in the case of area discriminations, is not
an absolute one, but subject to various conditional limitations, and to certain
clearly stated exceptions:
a. Intent: In order to come within the prohibited area, the person cov-
ered must do the prohibited act "for the purpose of injuring competitors and
destroying competition." 10 It should, of course, be borne in mind that one
is normally presumed to intend the usual consequences of his act, and accord-
ingly if it can be shown that competition is injured or destroyed and com-
petitors are injured as a consequence of the act, and that such consequences
were reasonably foreseeable by the author of the act, then intent is probably
sufficiently established.l0a
b. Exceptions: Prohibitions upon sales below costs, and give-away sales,
as above mentioned, do not apply to the following situations:
(i) Closing out, in good faith, the owner's stock, or any part of it, for
for the purpose of discontinuing trade in such stock or commodity."
(ii) Sale of seasonal goods.
12
(iii) Bona-fide sale of perishable goods to prevent loss to the vendor by
spoilage or depreciation.
13
(iv) Sale of goods which are damaged or deteriorated in quality.
14
In each of the above four cases, however, the exception is subject specifically
to the proviso that notice be given to the public. The act does not specify
the nature of the "notice" which must be given, that being a matter best as-
certained in the light of specific circumstances, upon the criterion of actual
suitability to purpose of the device or devices adopted.
(v) Judicial sales.' 5
(vi) Sales "in an endeavor made in good faith to meet the legal prices
of a competitor as herein defined selling the same article or product,
°Id., Sec. 3.
10, Supra, note 2, at page 48.
" Senate Bill 108, Sec. 6(a).
12 Ibid.
"Ibid.
" Id., Sec. 6(b).
"Id., Sec. 6(c).
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or services or output of a service trade, in the same locality or
trade area."1 6
Though very little question arises concerning five of the exceptions-
save with reference to the question of bona fides in the first and the substan-
tive adequacy of notice with reference to the first four, as heretofore men-
tioned-numerous problems arise as to the sixth exception, which is, or has
heretofore been, the basis of defense in the larger number of cases at nisi prius.
Accordingly, one of the principal provisions of the amendment to the act,
recently adopted, has as its purpose clarification of the concepts involved
therein.
3. Secret Rebates: Like its Federal prototype, the Robinson-Patman Act,
the Colorado Unfair Practices Act discountenances secret rebates, and similar
allowances, disallowing "the secret payment or allowance of rebates, refunds,
commissions, or unearned discounts, whether in the form of money or other-
wise, or secretly extending to certain purchasers special services or privileges
not extended to all purchasers purchasing upon like terms and conditions." 17
a. Intent: The interdicted practices are prohibited only where they are
"to the injury of a competitor," and where they "tend to destroy competition."
Though of very apparent substantive importance, such provisions of the
state acts have as yet been very little interpreted in the courts, since, by rea-
son of their parallelism with Federal legislation, many cases which might
otherwise come within their purview are Federally processed. However, in-
asmuch as there is a very strong similarity between these provisions and
those of Robinson-Patman Act, and some provisions of the Clayton Act,
there is an abundance of Federal authority at hand to assist in interpretation,
should incidence of violations make it requisite.
What Is "Cost"?
As we have seen, the act provides a trinity of prohibitions, but, of them
all, the most important is the prohibition against sales below cost, or give-
away sales, since it is in that particular area that the Unfair Practices acts
go beyond existing Federal legislation, and it is that feature of the acts which
makes them of greatest importance in both retail and wholesale selling opera-
tions.
1. Definitions:
a. Production: Cost, when applied to production, includes cost of raw
materials, cost of labor, and all "overhead expenses" of the producer.1 8
b. Distribution: As applied to distribution, "cost" is the invoice or re-
placement cost of the article or product, to the distributor or vendor, which-
ever of those costs may be lower, plus "cost of doing business."
c. Overhead Expense: For purposes of the act, "overhead expense" and
"Id., Sec. 6(d).
"Id.. Sec. 7.Id., Sec. 3(a).
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"cost of doing business" arc identical terms, and include all costs of doing
business incurred in the conduct of such business. Certain enumerated items
must be included unequivocally: (i) Labor, including salaries paid executives
and officers, (ii) Rent, (iii) Interest on borrowed capital, (iv) Depreciation,
(v) Selling cost, (vi) Maintenance of equipment, (vii) Delivery costs, (viii)
Credit losses, (ix) Licenses, (x) Taxes, (xi) Insurance, (xii) Advertising.
For a considerable period of time prior to the war, the cases which were
brought under Unfair Practices acts primarily concerned themselves with the
element of "cost of doing business" or "overhead costs," inasmuch as the
cutting of prices was usually not cutting below the actual cost to the seller
of the merchandise being sold. More recently, emphasis has shifted because
of the so-called "deep-cutting" of prices, which involves sales at a price below
actual replacement or inventory cost of the goods so sold. In cases involving
the first type of sale, determination of overhead or operating expenses is
naturally of vital importance. In cases of the second type, it is not conse-
quential. Since, where the sale is below cost of the goods, violation is clear
without considering overhead. Variant economic and merchandising situa-
tions, however, will produce varying patterns of violation, and the problem
of overhead or operating costs, though not recently pressing, remains of sub-
stantial significance.
Our court, in Dikeou et al. v. Food Distributors Association, 19 had be-
fore it the problem of overhead costs, and finally decided that "in determin-
ing the 'cost of doing business' under the Unfair Practices Act, if a particular
method adopted by a merchant cannot, under the facts disclosed, be said to
be unreasonable and does not disclose an intent to evade the law, the method
so adopted should be accepted as correct."120
That particular case involved cash and carry cigarette sales, and de-
pended upon a matter of mills for its determination. There was introduced
into evidence by the defendant a cost survey, made by an accountant hired
by defendant, theoretical in its nature, and attempting to departmentalize
the cost of the business, though in fact the books did not reveal such depart-
mentalization. Adopting a rule of "reasonableness" with reference to the
problem, the court stated :21
"There is no contention here that the cost must be absolutely ex-
act. Good faith, however, is necessary. The evidence warrants a find-
ing of lack of good faith in the instant case. This involves also the
reasonableness of the theoretical separation of the service department
and the cash-and-carry department in ascertaining the cost of doing
business. The separation is seriously challenged by plaintiff. The Mon-
tana case cited above holds that what is meant by 'cost' is 'what busi-
'" Supra, note 2.
:0 Id., Syllabus 4.
'I Id., at page 46.
ness men generally mean, namely, the approximate cost arrived at by
a reasonable rule.'"
The court then went on to state that under the rule, the theoretical de-
partmentalization--a device attempted to be used by many defendants who
do not actually departmentalize upon their books--would not be considered
a satisfactory or "reasonable" cost basis.
2. Establishment. We have noted above that, as applied to distribution,
cost" is invoice or replacement cost to the vendor, whichever is lower, plus
overhead costs. An exception, however, is made in the case of articles, goods,
or products purchased at forced, bankrupt, or closeout sale, or sale outside of
the ordinary channels of trade. In order that such a cost may be considered,
for the purposes of the act, the invoice cost, several special conditions must
be met:
22
a. Segregation: The goods, articles, or products must be kept separate
from those purchased in ordinary channels of trade.
b. Advertising: The goods must be advertised and sold as goods pur-
chased other than through normal channels of trade, and the advertisement
must state:
(i) Conditions under which goods were purchased.
(ii) Quantity of goods to be sold or offered.
3. Cost Surveys: Where there exists, in the trade or industry of which
a violator of the act is a member, an established cost survey for the area in
which the alleged violations have taken place, then it "shall be deemed com-
petent evidence" 23 to be used in proving violation of the provisions relating
to sales below cost.
There have been, from time to time, problems which have arisen with
reference to surveys, as with reference to individual cost studies. They are
problems of cost accounting, which is, of course, rather an involved field.
Presumably the Colorado court, which has not had occasion specifically to
pass upon the matter, would apply to such a survey the same rule of reason-
ableness applied to individual cost studies in the Dikeou case.
Some problems may also arise out of a misuse of the cost survey, for,
should any industry be so unwise as to attempt to agree upon cost of doing
business, rather than to determine statistically what is an industry-wide cost,
there could be repercussions under the Sherman Act. It is not necessary to
state here, of course, that the Unfair Practices acts in no way countenance
such abuses, and the Federal courts, particularly in the California cases in-
volving that problem, have been careful to state that the validity of the act
was in no way questioned, but only the propriety of conduct of the particular
defendants there involved.




Enforcement of The Act
Before enactment of the 1949 amendatory legislation, enforcement of
the act could be had in several different ways:
1. Injunction. Any person, firm, private corporation, municipal or other
public corporation, or trade association might, and still may, bring action to
enjoin violation of the act. 24 It was specifically held in the Dikeou case that
a non-profit corporation was properly a party plaintiff, 25 and most of the cases
brought under the act have been by such groups heretofore, though, of course,
many are instituted by individuals claiming injury.
a. Damages: It is not necessary that actual damage to the plaintiff be
alleged or proved.
26
b. Allegations: It is sufficient, in an injunction proceeding or prosecu-
tion of any person as officer, director, or agent, to allege and prove unlawful
intent of the person, firm, or corporation, for whom he acts, 27 any director,
officer, or agent being-equally responsible for violation with the person, firm,
or corporation for whom or which he acts.
28
2. Treble Damages. If a plaintiff does prove damage, then, in addition
to the injunctive relief mentioned, he is entitled to recover three times the
amount of actual damage sustained.
29
3. Criminal Provisions. Violation of the provisions of the act constitutes
a misdemeanor, whether such violation be as principal, agent, officer, or di-
rector. Each "single violation" constitutes such misdemeanor, and the pen-
alty consists of a fine of not less than $100, nor more than $1,000, or im-
prisonment not exceeding six months, or both. 30
4. Contracts. Any contract which is made in violation of the act is
illegal, and no recovery may be had upon it by process of law, there being an
express proviso protecting payment of patronage refunds by cooperatives.
3'
Each and every one of the foregoing provisions, still extant in the law,
has existed in the previous law, and as a consequence the law, in its major
substantive particulars, despite the publicity given it of late, is in no way
altered by the amendments, which are primarily procedural in their nature.
Moreover, the constitutional validity of the legislation has not been suc-
cessfully questioned, and the indication is clear that, if questioned, our court
would uphold the law, refusing to inquire into the wisdom of the policy
behind it:
3 2
"The constitutionality of the act is not challenged either in the
"Id., Sec. 9(a).
Supra, note 2, at pages 41-42.
"8 Senate Bill 108, Sec. 9(a).
" Id., Sec. 5.




"Supra, note 2, at page 41.
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briefs or assignments of error. Substantially similar acts have been
held by four state supreme courts not to be in violation of federal and
state due-process-of-law clauses. Wholesale Tobacco Dealers v. Na-
tional Candy & Tobacco Co., 11 Cal. (2d) 634, 82 P. 2d 3; Associ-
ated Merchants v. Ormesher, 107 Mont. 530, 86 P. 2d 1031; Rust
v. Griggs, 172 Tenn. 566, 113 S. W. 2d 733; 86 U. of Pa. L. Rev.
780; State v. Langley, 53 Wyo. 332, 84 P. 2d 767. It has been said
that the true purpose of acts of this character was to eliminate de-
structive price competition and the economic effect of the sale of
"loss leaders." It also has been argued that free competition may as
easily be destroyed by the unfair practices of below-cost selling as by
combinations in restraint of trade. Whether such arguments are
sound or such legislation is wise or unwise, is solely a problem for
the lawmakers. It is not necessary to cite the numerous authorities
which have so held."
Injunctive action under the act was, moreover, upheld in Old Homestead
Bread Company et al. v. Marx Baking Company.
3
Moreover, in Smith Brothers Cleaners& Dyers, Inc. v. People ex rel
Rogers,34 the court, although holding that certain administrative provisions of
chapter 113, S. L. '37, relating to cleaning and dyeing trade were invalid pro-
cedurally, held that the basic act was perfectly valid, it being a fair practices
act, one section of which very much resembles the Unfair Practices Act. As
to this legislation, the court said, quoting Nebbia v. New York ":
"The Constitution does not secure to anyone liberty to conduct
his business in such fashion as to inflect injury upon the public at
large, or upon any substantial group of people. Price control, like any
other form of regulation, is unconstitutional only if arbitrary, discrim-
inatory, or demonstrably irrelevant to the policy the legislature is
free to adopt, and hence an unwarranted interference with individual
liberty."
Concluding that there was an adequate basis in policy even for fixing minimum
prices in the cleaning industry, the court held the act substantively valid.
The 1949 Amendments
The basic structure of the act remaining, then, intact, and verbatim as
previously enacted, the basic changes which have been made are four:
1. Enforcement. Inasmuch as the provisions previously existing in the
act left its civil enforcement wholly in private hands, and inasmuch as little
reliance was, in practice, had upon the criminal sanctions, enforcement of
the act tended to gravitate into the hands of trade associations and other
"108 Colo. 375, 117 P. 2d 1007 (1941).
108 Colo. 448, 119 P. 2d 623 (1941).
291 U. S. 502, 54 S. Ct. 505, 78 L. Ed. 940.
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corporate bodies, who were faced with a nearly impossible task, both from the
point of time involved, and from the point of view of finance. The situation
was not unlike that which had faced many other states subsequent to enact-
ment of their basic Unfair Practices legislation, and that problem has been
elsewhere solved by provision for administrative processing of civil enforce-
ment features.
Accordingly, Section 9 of the Act was amplified and broadened to give
certain administrative powers to the Director of Revenue:
a. Powers of Director: Without prejudice to any of the private rights
of enforcement elsewhere detailed, the act provides that "the Director of
Revenue of the State of Colorado shall, as an incident to and power of his
office, have like and similar powers to those above set forth, and it shall be
his duty, upon showing by any person, firm, private corporation, municipal
corporation, or trade association, that there is cause or reason to believe that
any person or persons subject to the provisions of this Act are violating any
term or provision of Section 1 to 7 hereof, inclusive, to prosecute actions for
violation of any of the said provisions and of all provisions of this Act, and
seek injunctions or restraining orders to enjoin the continuance thereof by
any defendant or defendants."1
36
b. Mandatory Action: It is mandatory that the Director seek injunctive
relief or restraining order to enjoin continuance of violation if any person,
firm, corporation, or trade association, in writing and under oath, presents a
statement setting forth facts sufficient to constitute a prima facie case of vio-
lation, and he is empowered for that purpose to sue in the courts. 37
c. Counsel: It is made the duty of the Attorney General and every
District Attorney, when requested by the Director, to advise and consult with
him concerning institution and prosecution of actions provided for, and to
act as counsel, but the Director may select, appoint, and recompense from
public funds any attorney-at-law as special prosecutor.
38
d. Rules and Regulations: The Director is given authority to promulgate
rules and regulations not inconsistent with the provisions of the act and to
publish the same.39
e. Finance: Provision is made for financing such arrangements by means
of a license, at an annual fee of $1.00, required of all persons, firms, corpora-
tions, or organizations now required to have store licenses under state law.
Such licenses are to issue for the same period as store licenses, and the pro-
ceeds are to be credited to the Department of Revenue Administration Fund
for enforcement of the provisions of the act, and for no other purpose, overplus
to be rendered into the general fund at the end of each year. 40
Senate Bill 108, Sec. 9(a).
7d., Sec. 9(b).
'Id., Sec. 9(c).
39 Id., Sec. 9(d).
oId., Sec. 9(e).
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Such enforcement provisions are in no way unusual. Montana provides
for enforcement of its act by the Montana Trade Commission, without addi-
tional compensation, the Attorney General acting as counsel to the Com-
mission. 41 Utah provides for enforcement by the Utah Trade Commission,
which may hold hearings, and institute action for injunctive relief, such pro-
ceedings being conducted by the District Attorneys.42 Idaho has an arrange-
ment almost identical with that we have recently adopted, whereby enforce-
ment is in the hands of the Commissioner of Finance, to be assisted by the
Attorney General. 43 Minnesota has created a Department of Business Re-
search and Development, charged with erforcement of a number of acts, in-
cluding the Unfair Practices Act, 44 while in kansas, 4C North Dakota,46 and
Wyoming 47 special duties are given to the Attorney General and to State,
County, or Prosecuting Attorneys to enforce the civil provisions of the
various state Unfair Practices acts.
2 Evidence: It is specially provided, because of certain questions aris-
ing under Article V of the amendments to the Constitution of the United
States, and Article II, Section 18, of the Constitution of the State of Colo-
rado, being those sections dealing with self-incrimination, that any defendant
may be required to testify, under subpoena duly issued, or pursuant to the
Rules of Civil Procedure, in actions brought under provisions of the act,
and that the books and records of such defendant may be introduced into
evidence. It is provided, specifically, that no information so obtained may be
used as a basis for a misdemeanor prosecution instituted against such de-
fendant.
48
3. Advertising: Because it has for many years been a patent abuse in
the retail trade to advertise "loss leaders" which the persons so advertising did
not intend to supply, merely to divert persons into the stores of such adver-
tisers, it is made specifically unlawful to advertise goods, wares, or merchandise
which the advertiser is not prepared and able to supply in pursuance of such
advertisements. 
49
4. Prima Facie Case: By reason of the provisions of the Robinson-Patman
Act, persons on the jobbers lists, that is, wholesalers buying from jobbers in
carload lots, are necessarily able to purchase goods each at the same price,
having attained maximum quantities and so maximum quantity discounts, and
similarly, it is impossible for them to purchase-save in case of distressed sales
-at prices lower than those accorded under circumstances of maximum quan-
"Session Laws of Montana, 1939.
2 Utah Code Annotated, Chapter 4, Sec. 16A-2-14.
"Session Laws of Idaho, 1945, Chapter 206, page 387.
Session Laws of Minnesota, 1947, Chapter 567, pages 1004-1013.
'35 General Statutes, Chapter 50, Article 4 (1947 supplement).
"'43 Revised Code, Chapter 51-10, page 3440.
"'45 Statutes, Volume 3, Chapter 39, Section 402.
"Senate Bill 108, Sec. 10.
"Id., at 12.
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tity discount. In recent times the most patent violations of the act involved
in this discussion have been sales of goods, by retailers, at prices below the
prices at wholesale, to such persons upon the jobbers lists. Inasmuch as it is
clear that, under such circumstances, the goods so sold could not be pur-
chased legally at such prices, it is provided that showing that the sales price
is below such minimal wholesale cost is a prima facie case of violation, though,
of course, it is specifically provided that such prima facie case is rebuttable by
showing by the defendant that he has purchased the goods at a price below
wholesale price, or prices to persons on the jobbers' lists, or by showing that
he has in good faith met the legal price of a competitor.
The statutory provision, 50 is merely an embodiment of a procedural stand-
ard necessarily arising out of legally required merchandising techniques, and
heretofore uniformly applied at nisi prius, doing nothing more than establish-
ing the method of proving a prima facie case, though allowing very definitely
rebuttal by cogent evidence.
5. Legal Prices of a Competitor: The principal defense presented in re-
cent times in cases at nisi prius under the Unfair Practices acts is that the
defendant has been meeting prices of competitors. However, in order to con-
stitute a defense, it is necessary that it be shown that the prices met are the
"legal" prices of a competitor. The phrase "legal price" has proven to an ex-
tent confusing, and indeed our Supreme Court said, in the Homestead case, 51
"As to the phrases, 'legal consideration' and 'legal price,' no court can an-
ticipate the meaning of such words in advance of their use in particular situa-
tions. It will be time enough to pass upon their significance as and when
questions concerning them arise. Their meaning here as applicable to ad-
mitted facts was plain enough."
While defendants frequently present evidence of prices of competitors,
that evidence often relates to persons outside the competitive area of the de-
fendant-as in the cases wherein merchants have boasted that they will meet
any posted price in a city-or is distant in time, or clearly covers a price con-
cerning the legality of which no inquiry has been made. To be sure, it is
unlikely that any business man can know to a certainty the fiscal arrangements
of his competitors, but he should at least be put upon inquiry, and made to
show bona fides in the meeting of deep-cut prices, before being allowed to
escape the consequences of below-cost selling upon a plea of "meeting com-
petition." Any other policy leads to circular violations of the act and to basic
violation of its principles.
Accordingly, there have been set up in the act, as procedural guides, cer-
tain standards of conduct, with relation to "legal price," in keeping with
judicial standards adopted in numerous decided cases, and followed uniformly
by the Colorado courts at nisi prius.
'0 Id., at 13.
*' Supra, note 33, at 380.
DICTA
In order that a price met be considered a "legal price" within the act, it
is incumbent on the defendant to show:
a. Meeting of a specific price or prices;
b. Of a specific competitor or competitors;
c. In an area directly competitive with defendant;
d. At a time or times when such price or prices were actually competi-
tive with those offered by such competitor.
5 2
e. Quotation of such price by such competitor on the same or similar
goods, wares, or merchandise.
53
f. Sale or offer of sale of such goods, wares or merchandise of the com-
petitor in the trade area of the defendant.
5 4
g. Quotation of price by defendant directly and immediately in an en-
deavor in good faith to meet the prices quoted by competitor.
55
h. Making by the defendant of a bona fide effort to determine legality
of price. 56
Amendments Primarily Procedural
Again, this matter is not primarily a change in substance of the act,
which remains, as to the basic exception, precisely as it has always been, but
it is a statement of procedure, a clarification of elements of proof.
The act in question is one of great economic importance. It is one which
has been on our statute books for a period of a dozen years, and under which
numerous actions have been brought. It is an act around which controversies
of policy rage. It should, however, be understood for what it is, and recog-
nized as being not anomalous, but a normal part of our economic system,
prevalent in similar form upon the Federal statute books, and those of more
than half of all American jurisdictions.
For the somewhat pedantic form of the article the author apologizes to
the reader, but states, in explanation, that, copies of the new enactment being
not yet widely available, the form of presentation was hoped to be the most
useful in which information, perhaps of practical utility, might be presented.
Allan F. Asher, Independence Bldg., Colorado Springs would like to
purchase volumes 100 and 104 in order to round out his set of Colorado
reports.
George K. Thomas announced the opening of an office at 807 Ernest &
Cranmer Building, Denver, on June 1st.
Inadvertently omitted from previous DICTA was notice of the death of
Norman A. Hutchinson, member of the Denver Bar Association. Mr. Hutch-
inson was only 49 at the time of his death on April 29, 1949.
2 Senate Bill 108, Sec. 13(1).
5 Id., Sec. 13(2).
' Ibid.T Id., Sec. 13(3).
"Id., Sec. 13(4).
